NY – A federal jury awarded the former director of the Peekskill Housing Authority $1 million in a racial discrimination lawsuit. The suit alleged that the housing board’s chairwoman made derogatory statements about the Plaintiff’s ethnicity and orchestrated his removal because of bias against him.

CA – A federal jury awarded a $18.3 million to a six plaintiffs in an age discrimination case against Dr. Pepper Snapple. The company plans to appeal the decision but created a reserve for the damages.

TX – A federal jury found in favor of Christus Hospital St. Mary in a racial harassment case filed by a former security officer. The lawsuit alleged that the hospital allowed one African American employee to harass another African American employee because of her light skin. The plaintiff also alleged that she was constructively discharged because of the racially hostile work environment.

IL – A federal jury ordered Cook County and its former chairman of pathology to pay $7.6 million in a retaliation lawsuit brought by a physician in the county’s hospital. The Plaintiff alleged that the county suspended and terminated her based on her speaking out about hospital practices and because she filed an EEOC complaint of discrimination based on heritage and gender. The hospital claimed that it terminated the plaintiff because she misdiagnosed several patients with cancer and failed to follow established protocols and policies.

IL – A federal judge granted a Cicero Town president a new trial after a jury awarded a former town handyman $650,000 in damages in a political retaliation lawsuit. The judge threw out the verdict because of misconduct on the part of the defense attorney.

GA – The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered and reversed its previous decision in a racial discrimination case. The recent ruling upheld the jury’s $365,000 compensatory damages award to a former black employee of a Tyson chicken plant. The employee alleged that a white manager called him “boy” and that the term was a racial epithet.

The new law would make it unlawful to fail or refuse to consider an applicant because of his or her status as unemployed.  It would also prohibit the publication of job ads that include a provision that specifies that being unemployed disqualifies one from the job. 

According to the Washington Business Journal, Washington, D.C.’s new proposal to protect the unemployed from discrimination in the hiring process will cost the city $521,300 over the next four years.  The Office of Human Rights would have to add an additional 150 investigations to its caseload. 

Our prior post on the prohibition against discrimination based on unemployment status in the American Jobs Act can be found here.

The case originates in 2004, when OFCCP sent a letter advising Bank of America (“BOA”) that it had been selected for an audit.  OFCCP requested BOA to produce its affirmative action plans and other documents within thirty days.  In its initial response, BOA asked for information about the process that resulted in its selection for audit and for an extension of the 30-day deadline.  OFCCP stated, in response, that it followed its standard selection procedures.  BOA ultimately produced the requested information.  OFCCP then identified indicators of bias in the initial data and requested more information, but BOA refused to provide it.  The Department of Labor Administrative Review Board then found BOA in violation of Executive Order 11246.

In its district court action, Bank of America challenged all aspects of OFCCP’s investigation, including the criteria used to select it for an audit.  In response to Bank of America’s Fourth Amendment claims, OFCCP argued that selecting the bank for a “desk audit” was not subject to the Fourth Amendment because it did not involve entry onto private property. In OFCCP’s view, a desk audit is simply a request for documents that contractors are required to maintain and provide on request.

The Court disagreed with OFCCP’s argument, stating that OFCCP was required to show that the request for audit data was “within the authority of the agency.”  The request must also be “not too indefinite, and . . . reasonably relevant” – i.e. the “Oklahoma Press” standard. 

The court ultimately recommended applying a different standard to the initial decision to select a contractor for audit. Magistrate Judge Robinson’s decision concluded that the initial selection must be based on “(1) specific evidence of an existing violation, (2) reasonable legislative or administrative standards that have been met with respect to that particular contractor or (3) an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria.”   This is known as the “Beverly Enterprises” standard.

According to the Court, OFCCP’s initial selection decision was unlawful because OFCCP failed to demonstrate that the bank had been selected in accordance with neutral selection criteria.  This was not ultimately of much help to BOA, however, as the Court determined that BOA had waived its Fourth Amendment rights by voluntarily producing the requested information.

The FLSA allows employer to pay a minimum cash wage of $2.13 per hour to employees in a “tipped occupation” as long as the employee’s tips make up the difference between the $2.13 cash hourly wage and the current federal minimum wage. Plaintiffs claimed that Applebee’s required them to perform work that did not produce tips, such as cleaning, inventory, stocking, and preparing food, for significant portions of their shift while compensating them at the lower $2.13 tipped rate. It was undisputed between the parties that plaintiffs received in cash hourly wage and tips a sum at least equal to the required minimum wage per hour for all hours worked.

Pursuant to Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations, for employees who hold more than one job for the same employer, one which generates tips and one which does not, the employee is entitled to the full minimum wage rate while performing the job that does not generate tips. The DOL’s interpretive Field Handbook states that if a tipped employee spends a substantial amount of time (defined as more than 20 percent) performing related, non-tipped work, then the employer may not take the tip credit for the amount of time the employee performs those non-tipped duties.

The district court denied Applebee’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the DOL’s Handbook was reasonable, persuasive and entitled to deference. The district court also concluded that plaintiffs had to “make a prima facie showing which hours were not properly paid,” and if there were no records of the time spent on specific duties, then the burden would shift to Applebee’s to show that the employees’ calculations were not reasonable.  Applebee sought an interlocutory appeal from Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing the DOL’s Handbook is contrary to statute and regulations.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order. The Court of Appeals concluded that the DOL’s interpretation was entitled to deference, and therefore, controlling because the interpretation was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with statute or regulation. The Court of Appeals further concluded the district court applied the proper burden of proof in which the initial burden was on the employees to establish that they worked hours for which they were not properly paid. If Applebee’s did not maintain sufficient records from which the employees can differentiate between when they performed tipped duties and whey they performed non-tipped duties, then the employees may use the relaxed standard of proof by “produc[ing] sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”

The Supreme Court denied certiorari of this case on January 17, 2012. Accordingly, employers who rely on the tip credit to satisfy the FLSA’s minimum wage requirements should both (a) ensure that they maintain records regarding the time each employee spends on tipped and non-tipped tasks; and (b) pay employees the minimum wage, without relying on the tip credit, for all time spent on non-tipped tasks if non-tipped tasks constitute a substantial amount (or more than 20 percent) of the employee’s time.

The Court of Appeals decision can be found here.

Plaintiffs were insurance claim adjusters that filed a lawsuit against their employer for unpaid overtime alleging that that they were erroneously classified as administrative exempt employees. Plaintiffs moved for summary adjudication of defendants’ affirmative defense that plaintiffs were exempt from overtime compensation. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ summary adjudication motion. The parties sought interlocutory review by the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of the summary adjudication motion and held that the adjusters did not qualify as administrative exempt employees as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal concluded that only employees who performed work for general operations or at the level of making company policy could qualify under the “directly related to management policies or general business operations” element of the administrative exemption test.

The Supreme Court reversed finding the Court of Appeal misapplied the substantive law. The Supreme Court remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions that it review the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ summary adjudication motion under the appropriate legal standard as set out by the Supreme Court’s decision. The Supreme Court rejected the view that the administrative exemption is limited to employees who operate at the level of policy making.  The Court stated that the administrative/production dichotomy is a useful but it should not be relied upon in all cases. The Court held the Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulations expressly incorporated into the IWC Wage Order, and no other DOL regulations, should be relied upon in interpreting the administrative exemption. The Court concluded that the Court of Appeal erred by not applying the incorporated regulations.

The Supreme Court stated that to qualify as administratively exempt, employees must “(1) be paid at a certain level, (2) their work must be administrative, (3) their primary duties must involve that administrative work, and (4) they must discharge those primary duties by regularly exercising independent judgment and discretion.” The Supreme Court went on to explain that qualifying as “administrative” has both a qualitative and quantitative element that must be satisfied.  The “qualitative” character is satisfied where employees service a business through such actions as “advising management, planning, negotiating, and representing the company.” The “quantitative” character is “whether work is of ‘substantial importance’ to management policy or general business operations.”  The Supreme Court provided no further explanation on what would qualify as “substantial importance.” Accordingly, the application of the administrative exemption still remains unclear under California law.

To read the entire text of the decision, click here.

The EEOC’s press release about 2011 results can be found here and their 2011 Performance and Accountability Report can be found here.  Fox News has a story here. 

The agency notes that “In FY 2011, the EEOC secured more than $364.6 million in monetary benefits through its private sector administrative enforcement activities, the highest level of monetary relief ever obtained by the Commission through the administrative process. This is $45 million more than was recovered in FY 2010. Overall, the agency secured both monetary and non-monetary benefits for more than 19,570 people through administrative enforcement activities – mediation, settlements, conciliations and withdrawals with benefits.”

The agency has also continued its focus on eliminating “systemic discrimination” through aggressive enforcement in that area.  The report highlights the following significant resolutions of cases of alleged “systemic discrimination”:

EEOC v. Verizon Maryland, Inc., et al. – In this nationwide ADA suit, the EEOC alleged that Verizon unlawfully denied reasonable accommodations to hundreds of employees with disabilities, and disciplined or fired them pursuant to inflexible attendance policies that did not provide accommodation for disability-related absences. A three-year consent decree provided a $20 million fund to compensate approximately 800 victims, and represents the largest disability discrimination settlement in a single lawsuit in EEOC history. The decree also requires the company to revise its attendance plans and ADA policy to include reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities.

EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc. – In this series of cases filed in Illinois against a trucking firm, the EEOC alleged that the firm gave black employees at several Chicago-area facilities inferior work assignments and subjected them to harsher discipline and harassment based on their race, including multiple incidents of hangman’s nooses and racist graffiti and cartoons. A consent decree provides $10 million to 259 victims and requires the development of new anti-harassment policies and specific recordkeeping and complaint reporting procedures. The decree also requires the firm to retain consultants to examine the company’s discipline and work assignment procedures and recommend changes to prevent racial disparities.

EEOC v. International Profit Association– In a widespread sexual harassment case, the EEOC alleged that a telemarketing firm in Illinois systemically subjected female employees to sexual assaults and propositions, inappropriate touching, and crude sexual comments. The court agreed with the EEOC that the firm’s conduct constituted a pattern or practice of discrimination, meaning that the harassment was so pervasive that it was the firm’s standard operating procedure. A consent decree provides $8 million to 82 victims.

EEOC v. Scrub Inc.– In a major hiring discrimination case, the EEOC alleged that a janitorial services company at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport refused to hire black applicants based on their race. A consent decree provides $3 million to 539 victims, mandates the hiring of certain claimants who still want jobs, and requires the firm to use its best efforts to reach certain hiring goals.

EEOC v. 3M Company– In this nationwide age discrimination lawsuit, the EEOC charged that 3M unlawfully laid off hundreds of employees over the age of 45 during a series of reductions in force. The EEOC also asserted that older employees were denied leadership training and laid off to make way for younger leaders. A three-year consent decree provides $3 million to approximately 290 former employees. In addition, 3M will implement a review process for termination decisions and training on how to prevent age bias. The company will also post openings for positions it had not advertised previously, to enable older employees to apply.

EEOC v. AKAL Security– In a nationwide pregnancy discrimination case filed in Kansas, the EEOC alleged that a security services firm engaged in a pattern or practice of forcing its pregnant employees, working as contract security guards on U.S. Army bases, to take leave and then discharging them because of pregnancy. A consent decree provides $1.6 million to 26 female security guards.

EEOC v. Denny’s Inc.– In this nationwide ADA suit filed in Maryland, the Commission challenged the restaurant’s maintenance of a maximum medical leave policy that automatically denied additional medical leave beyond a pre-determined limit. A consent decree provides $1.3 million to 34 victims and provides substantial programmatic relief, including changes to the medical leave policy, a corporate-level oversight and auditing process for leave decisions, and reporting to the EEOC.

Cheryl Perich was employed by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in 1999 as a lay teacher. Later, she completed her colloquy and was designated by the church as a commissioned minister. Perich taught taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music.  She also taught religion four days a week, led the students at the school in prayer and devotions, and led the school-wide chapel services.

Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy in 2004.  After being on disability leave for several months, Perich reported that she still was not able to return to work. The congregation then voted to release Perich from her calling as a minister, utilizing a “peaceful release” – the congregation would pay a portion of her health insurance premiums in exchange for her resignation. Perich refused to resign and threatened legal action. The school board later terminated her on the grounds of insubordination and disruptive behavior as well has based on her damaged working relationship with the school.

The EEOC brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor on behalf of Perich, alleging that Perich’s employment was terminated in retaliation for her threatening to file a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment, invoking the “ministerial exception” – arguing that the suit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims involved the relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers. The church claimed that Perich had violated its religious principle to resolve disputes internally by. The district court agreed with Hosanna-Tabor that Perich’s termination was covered by the ministerial exception. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that Perich did not qualify as a minister under the exception because she had the same duties as a lay teacher.

The Supreme Court first reviewed the history of the First Amendment and the roots of the ministerial exception. The Court concluded that there is a ministerial exception and that requiring a church or religious institution to retain an unwanted minister causes government intrusion into the internal governance of the church.  This deprives the church of control over selecting who will represent its beliefs, interfering with the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.

Second, the Court considered the scope of the ministerial exception. The Court found that Perich did fall under the exception and cited numerous reasons. Hosanna-Tabor held Perich out as a minister, including issuing her a “diploma of vocation” with the title of “Minister of Religion Commissioned.”  The congregation also reviewed Perich’s “skills of ministry” as part of her employee review. She also received religious training as a minister and had to complete coursework and testing in her religious education. The Court also found that Perich held herself out as a minister – she claimed a special housing allowance on her taxes available to those in ministry. Perich’s job duties also reflected a religious role, including teaching religion, taking part in the chapel service at the church, leading students in devotional instruction.

The Court therefore concluded that religious groups have an interest in choosing their ministers – “When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.  The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”

For the full opinion, click here.

The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

EEOC Office of Legal Counsel staff members wrote the following informal discussion letter in response to an inquiry from a member of the public. This letter is intended to provide an informal discussion of the noted issue and does not constitute an official opinion of the Commission.

ADA: Qualification Standards; Disparate Impact

November 17, 2011

[ADDRESS]

Dear ____:

This is in response to your letter, dated October 9, 2009, and postmarked October 12, 2011, asking whether the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), prohibits the State of Tennessee from requiring students with learning disabilities to take “Gateway tests” or “end-of-course assessments” in order to receive their full high school diplomas. We responded to the same inquiry when we received it in December of 2010, by referring you to the Department of Education. Please find the earlier response attached.

In the event that you found our earlier response incomplete or were seeking additional clarification, however, we are responding to a statement in your letter that raises a concern under Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., which EEOC enforces. You correctly point out that some individuals cannot obtain a high school diploma, and therefore cannot obtain jobs requiring a high school diploma, because their learning disabilities caused them to perform inadequately on the end-of-course assessment.

Under the ADA, a qualification standard, test, or other selection criterion, such as a high school diploma requirement, that screens out an individual or a class of individuals on the basis of a disability must be job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. A qualification standard is job related and consistent with business necessity if it accurately measures the ability to perform the job’s essential functions (i.e. its fundamental duties). Even where a challenged qualification standard, test, or other selection criterion is job related and consistent with business necessity, if it screens out an individual on the basis of disability, an employer must also demonstrate that the standard or criterion cannot be met, and the job cannot be performed, with a reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.10, 1630.15(b) and (c); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app §§ 1630.10, 1630.15(b) and (c).

Thus, if an employer adopts a high school diploma requirement for a job, and that requirement “screens out” an individual who is unable to graduate because of a learning disability that meets the ADA’s definition of “disability,” the employer may not apply the standard unless it can demonstrate that the diploma requirement is job related and consistent with business necessity. The employer will not be able to make this showing, for example, if the functions in question can easily be performed by someone who does not have a diploma.

Even if the diploma requirement is job related and consistent with business necessity, the employer may still have to determine whether a particular applicant whose learning disability prevents him from meeting it can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a reasonable accommodation. It may do so, for example, by considering relevant work history and/or by allowing the applicant to demonstrate an ability to do the job’s essential functions during the application process. If the individual can perform the job’s essential functions, with or without a reasonable accommodation, despite the inability to meet the standard, the employer may not use the high school diploma requirement to exclude the applicant. However, the employer is not required to prefer the applicant with a learning disability over other applicants who are better qualified.
We hope this information is helpful. This letter is an informal discussion of the issues you raised and should not be considered an official opinion of the EEOC.

Sincerely,

 

/s/
Aaron Konopasky
Attorney Advisor
ADA/GINA Policy Division

This page was last modified on January 5, 2012.

Under Section 503, covered contractors must take affirmative action to employ and advance the employment of qualified individuals with disabilities. The proposed rule incorporates the expanded definition of disability under the final regulations to the ADAAA. The proposed rule also contains a proposed text of the voluntary self-identification invitations that contractors would use when asking an applicant or employee to identify as an individual with a disability. Contractors, under the proposed rule, would be required allow applicants and employees the opportunity to voluntarily self-identify as individuals with disabilities (1) when applying for a position, (2) after an offer is received, but before employment begins, and (3) annually for all employees.

The proposed rule sets a utilization goal of 7% of a covered contractor’s workforce to be individuals with disabilities. OFCCP seeks comment on a range of values between 4% and 10%. This includes the possible addition of a 2% sub-goal for individuals with certain particularly severe or targeted disabilities. OFCCP seeks comment on both the concept of using a sub-goal and on the disabilities that should be included in a sub-goal.

Additionally, the proposed rule outlines specific recruiting effort obligations for contractors, including a minimum number of outreach and recruitment efforts. Examples include linkage agreements with certain organizations to develop other recruitment and training opportunities and listing opportunities at certain government employment career centers. Contractors, under the proposed rule, will be required to conduct annual self-assessments of recruitment efforts and maintain data measurements on individuals with disabilities who applied and were hired.

Also, the proposed rule requires contractors to take certain steps to disseminate information. Incorporating their respective affirmative action program into their policy and discussing the AAP in orientation and management training program are proposed requirements. Contractors would be responsible for identifying individuals responsible for the AAP on all internal and external communication about the program.

Notably, under the proposed rule, covered contractors must develop written procedures for processing requests for reasonable accommodation and disseminate these procedures to all employees, including those who work off-site. The procedures would include, among other things:

• A description of the reasonable accommodation process.
• Inform employees that requests may be made orally or in writing by an applicant, employee or a third party on behalf of another;
• Limit the processing time to five to ten business days (if no medical documents are needed);
• Explain when medical certification may be requested;
• Require any denial of a request for reasonable accommodation to be writing;
• Include contact information for the employee responsible for the procedures;
• Supervisors and management training on accommodation procedures annually and when any significant changes are made.

Comments on the proposed rules will be accepted by OFCCP until February 7, 2012. You may submit comments, identified by RIN number 1250-AA02, by any of the following methods:  Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.

Fax: (202) 693-1304 (for comments of six pages or less).

Mail: Debra A. Carr, Director, Division of Policy, Planning, and Program Development, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Room C-3325, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210.

A link to the Federal Register can be found here.

D.R. Horton, Inc. was a home builder that required each employee to sign a Mutual Arbitration Agreement which stated that: (a) all disputes and claims relating to the employee’s employment would be determined by final and binding arbitration; (b) the arbitrator could only hear individual claims and did not have the authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collection action or to award relief to a group or class of employees in one arbitration proceeding; and (c) the employee waives the right to file a lawsuit or other civil proceeding relating to his or her employment.  The NLRB concluded that the arbitration agreement “unlawfully restricts employees’ Section 7 right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection,” and D.R. Horton, Inc. “violated Section 8(a)(1) by requiring employees to waive their right to collectively pursue employment-related claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial.” 

As a matter of first impression, the NLRB further held that their decision under the NLRA does not conflict with the policy in favor of arbitration underlying the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion concluded permitted such arbitration agreements.  The NLRB stated that its holding was limited to those agreements that barred protected, concerted activity.  Therefore, “an agreement requiring arbitration of any individual employment-related claims, but not precluding a judicial forum for class or collective claims would not violate the NLRB, because it would not bar concerted activity.”    

It is likely that this decision will be appealed to the 11^th Circuit Court of Appeals, and perhaps ultimately, to the United States Supreme Court.  To read another blog post on how a California Court of Appeal has attempted to  chip away at the impact of the holding in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, click here. 

To read the full NLRB decision and order in D.R. Horton, Inc., click here. 

The first big story is that the NLRB has postponed the effective date of the new workplace poster until April 2012.  The Connecticut Employment Law Blog has the story here.

The second big story is that the NLRB has approved a new rule amending the union election procedure.  The Board approved a final rule amending its procedures for union election case procedure to take effect April 30, 2012.  The new rule is intended to simplify procedures and reduce legal delays to union elections. 

Under the new rule, regional hearings will be expressly limited to issues relevant to the question of whether an election should be conducted.  The hearing officer will have the authority to limit testimony to relevant issues, and to decide whether or not to accept post-hearing briefs.  Disputes regarding which employees are included in the bargaining unit will be resolved by the NLRB after the election takes place.  Additionally, all appeals of Regional Director decisions will be consolidated into a single post-election request for review.  Parties are currently permitted to appeal Regional Director decisions at multiple stages in the process.  In addition, the new rule makes all NLRB review of Regional Directors’ decisions discretionary. 

The new rule was drawn from a more comprehensive proposal that would have required employers to provide union organizers with a list of employees’ email addresses and phone numbers. 

The United States Chamber of Commerce has filed a lawsuit challenging the validity of the new rule.  The Chamber of Commerce argues that the NLRB’s new rule circumvents safeguards meant to ensure fair union elections by ensuring that employers have no time to talk to their employees about unionizing. 

Click here to read the final rule and introduction.

MO – A federal jury awarded a Kamen Technologies Corp. branch manager $760,000 in an age discrimination lawsuit.  The suit alleged that employee heard comments about the company needing younger managers, and after he complained to the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, the company demoted him and then suspended him without pay for two years.

IA – An Iowa jury found in favor of the North Iowa Regional Housing Authority in an age discrimination case.  The plaintiff alleged that the organization terminated her because of her young age, but the Housing Authority claimed that the plaintiff was only a provisional employee and subject to discharge if there were any disagreements.

TN – Atlas, Inc., a Tennessee restaurant company, will pay $39,232 in minimum and overtime back wages to 23 restaurant workers as a result of a U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division investigation.  The DOL also assessed $4, 301 in civil penalties for willful and repeat violations.

ME – A Maine jury found in favor of a local general contracting firm in a discrimination lawsuit.  A former worker alleged that the company wrongfully terminated him because of an on-the-job injury, but the company argued that it fired the employee because he had a long history of absenteeism.

TX – A federal jury awarded a former Texas Southern University women’s basketball coach $730,000 in a sex discrimination and retaliation lawsuit.  The suit alleged that the coach was threatened with demotion and then terminated for complaining that she was underpaid in comparison to a men’s basketball coach.

CA – A federal jury awarded a female lifeguard $100,000 in a discrimination lawsuit.  The suit alleged that the city of San Diego overlooked the lifeguard for promotion because its hiring practices discouraged the advancement of women.

CO – The Western Sugar Cooperative will pay $550,000 to settle a sex discrimination investigation. The EEOC alleged that the company denied female employees training, promotions, certain work assignments, year-round employment, and higher wages.

NM – Roberts Truck Centers has agreed to pay $300,000 to settle a class sex discrimination and retaliation lawsuit. The suit alleged that the company subjected female employees to sex harassment and that one employee was terminated because she complained about the harassment.

NY – The Town of Clarence and Western New York Fire Companies will pay $441,740 to settle a class age discrimination lawsuit brought on behalf of 35 firefighters. The suit alleged that the town and fire departments refused to allow firefighters over age 62 accrue the equivalent of a retirement pension because of their age.

MI – A Michigan City restaurant agreed to pay $23,000 to settle a sexual harassment lawsuit brought on behalf of a female hostess. The suit alleged that the restaurant allowed a manager to harass the hostess for months with sexual innuendo and propositions, subjecting her to a hostile work environment.

IL – Jay Medicar Transportation, LLC will pay $70,000 to settle a sex discrimination lawsuit brought on behalf of several female employees. The suit alleged that the company’s former director of operations harassed several women, including demanding sex in exchange for pay raises, scheduling changes, or continued employment.

CA – American Laser Centers has agreed to pay $125,000 to settle a sexual harassment and retaliation lawsuit brought on behalf of several women. The suit alleged that female staff members were sexually harassed by the landlord of the facility, including leering, unwelcome touching, sexual advances, and appearances by the visibly aroused landlord.

NC – Thomasville City Schools will pay $25,000 to settle an age discrimination lawsuit brought on behalf of a former assistant principal candidate. The suit alleged that the school failed to hire the candidate because of her age and selected two younger, less qualified candidates.

MD – The Mayor and the City Council of Ocean City have agreed to pay $38,000 to settle an age discrimination and retaliation lawsuit brought on behalf of an airport associate candidate. The suit alleged that the candidate was not hired because he was 62-years-old at the time of his application and that the airport manager made ageist comments to the applicant at the time of his interview.

CO – Tic Wyoming, a construction company, will pay $135,000 to settle a disability discrimination lawsuit. The suit alleged that an employee was terminated because of the need to make reasonable accommodation for his leg amputation.

NY – AT&T has settled an age discrimination lawsuit alleging that the company discriminated against a class of retired workers by denying them the opportunity for reemployment solely because they retired under early retirement or enhanced severance programs. AT&T and the EEOC have entered into a consent decree in which AT&T denied the allegations in the suit but agreed to change the company policies.